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Abstract 
This article examines the current debate about the nature of democracy and discusses the 
main theses of the approach called ‘deliberative democracy’ in its two main versions, the one 
put forward by John Rawls, and the other one put forward by Jürgen Habermas. While 
agreeing with them as regards to the need to develop a more of democracy than the one 
offered by the ‘aggregative’ model, I submit that they do not provide an adequate 
understanding of the main task of democracy. No doubt, by stating that democracy cannot 
be reduced to a question of procedures to mediate among conflicting interests, deliberative 
democrats defend a conception of democracy that presents a richer conception of politics. 
But, albeit in a different way than the view they criticize, their vision is also a rationalist one 
which leaves aside the crucial role played by ‘passions’ and collective forms of identifications 
in the field of politics.  
Moreover, in their attempt to reconcile the liberal tradition with the democratic one, 
deliberative democrats tend to erase the tension that exist between liberalism and 
democracy and they are therefore unable to come to terms with the conflictual nature of 
democratic politics. 
The main thesis that I put forward in this article is that democratic theory needs to 
acknowledge the ineradicability of antagonism and the impossibility of achieving a fully 
inclusive rational consensus. I argue that a model of democracy in terms of ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ can help us to better envisage the main challenge facing democratic politics today: 
how to create democratic forms of identifications that will contribute to mobilize passions 
towards democratic designs.  
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Artikel widmet sich dem gegenwärtigen Diskurs über das Wesen der Demokratie und 
untersucht die zentralen Thesen des Ansatzes der ‘deliberativen Demokratie’ in ihren zwei 
wesentlichen Ausprägungsformen: die von John Rawls und die von Jürgen Habermas. 
Obwohl die Autorin mit diesen Zugangsweisen insofern übereinstimmt, als sie es ebenfalls 
für notwendig erachtet, eine weitreichendere Konzeption von Demokratie als jene die durch 
das ‘aggregative’ Modell bereitgestellt wird, zu entwickeln, gibt sie zu bedenken, daß diese 
Konzepte nicht im Stande sind, ein angemessenes Verständnis für die Hauptaufgabe der 
Demokratie zu vermitteln. Indem Anhänger des Konzepts der ‘deliberativen Demokratie’ 
festhalten, daß Demokratie nicht auf Verfahrensfragen zur Vermittlung von entgegenge-
setzten Interessen reduziert werden kann, verteidigen sie zwar zweifelsohne eine 
Auffassungsweise der Demokratie, die eine weitreichendere Konzeption von Politik bein-
haltet. Ihre Zugangsweise ist jedoch sehr wohl – wenn auch in einer anderen Form als jene 
 Herangehensweise an der sie Kritik üben – auch rational, wonach die wesentliche Rolle die 
‘Leidenschaft’ und kollektive Formen der Identifikation im Bereich der Politik spielen, außer 
Acht gelassen wird. In dem Bestreben die liberale Zugangsweise mit jener der demo-
kratischen Herangehensweise zu vereinen, neigen die Vertreter des Ansatzes der 
‘deliberativen’ Demokratie dazu, die Spannungen, die zwischen ihnen existieren aufzulösen 
und sind somit nicht in der Lage, das konfliktreiche Wesen der demokratischen Politik zu 
bewältigen. 
Die Haupthese, die die Autorin in diesem Artikel vertritt, geht davon aus, daß demokratische 
Theorie die Unüberwindbarkeit von gewissen Antagonismen zu berücksichtigen hat. Sie 
vertritt die Meinung, daß ein Demokratiemodell in der Ausprägung des ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
dazu beitragen kann, die wesentliche Herausforderung mit der sich demokratische Politik 
derzeit konfrontiert sieht, besser zu bewältigen: demokratische Formen der Identifikation zu 
schaffen, die dazu führen können, Kräfte und ‘Passionen’ für demokratische Modelle zu 
mobilisieren. 
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As this turbulent century draws to a close, liberal democracy seems to be recognized as the 
only legitimate form of government. But does that indicate its final victory over its 
adversaries, as some would have it? There are serious reasons to be skeptical about such a 
claim. For once, it is not clear how strong is the present consensus and how long it will last. 
While very few dare to openly challenge the liberal democratic model, the signs of 
disaffection with present institutions are becoming widespread. An increasing number of 
people feel that traditional parties have ceased to take their interests into account and 
extreme right-wing parties are making important advances in many European countries. 
Moreover, even among those who are resisting the call of the demagogues, there is a 
marked cynicism about politics and politicians and this has a very corrosive effect on popular 
adhesion to democratic values. There is clearly a negative force at work in most liberal 
democratic societies, which contradicts the triumphalism that we have witnessed since the 
collapse of Soviet communism. 
It is with those considerations in mind that I will be examining the present debate in 
democratic theory. I want to evaluate the proposals that democratic theorists are offering in 
order to consolidate democratic institutions. I will concentrate my attention on the new 
paradigm of democracy, the model of “deliberative democracy”, which is currently becoming 
the fastest growing trend in the field. Their main idea: that in a democratic polity political 
decisions should be reached through a process of deliberation among free and equal 
citizens, has accompanied democracy since its birth in fifth century Athens. The ways of 
envisaging deliberation and the constituency of those entitled to deliberate have varied 
greatly, but deliberation has long played a central role in democratic thought. What we see 
today is therefore the revival of an old theme, not the sudden emergence of a new one. 
What needs scrutinizing, though, is the reason for this renewed interest in deliberation, as 
well as its current modalities. One explanation has certainly to do with the problems facing 
democratic societies today. Indeed, one proclaimed aim of deliberative democrats is to offer 
an alternative to the understanding of democracy, which has become dominant in the second 
half of this century, the “aggregative model”. Such a model was initiated by Joseph 
Schumpeter’s seminal work of 1947; Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,1 which argued 
that, with the development of mass democracy, popular sovereignty as understood by the 
classical model of democracy, had become inadequate. A new understanding of democracy 
was needed, putting the emphasis on aggregation of preferences, taking place through 
political parties for which people would have the capacity to vote at regular intervals. Hence 
Schumpeter’s proposal to define democracy as the system in which people have the 
opportunity of accepting or rejecting their leaders thanks to a competitive electoral process.  
                                                     
1
 Schumpeter, J. (1947) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy New York: Harper and Brothers 
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Further developed by theorists like Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy2 
the aggregative model became the standard one in the field, which called itself “empirical 
political theory”. The aim of this current was to elaborate a descriptive approach to 
democracy, in opposition to the classical normative one. The authors who adhered to this 
school considered that under modern conditions, notions like “common good” and “general 
will” had to be relinquished and that the pluralism of interests and values had to be 
acknowledged as coextensive with the very idea of “the people”. Moreover, given that in their 
view, self-interest, was what motivated  individuals to act – not the moral belief that they 
should do what was in the interest of the community –  they declared that it was interests 
and preferences that should constitute the lines over which political parties should be 
organized and provide the matter over which bargaining and voting would take place. 
Popular participation in the taking of decisions should rather be discouraged since it could 
only have dysfunctional consequences for the working of the system. Stability and order 
were more likely to result from compromise among interests than from mobilizing people 
towards an illusory consensus on the common good. As a consequence, democratic politics 
was separated from its normative dimension and began to be envisaged from a purely 
instrumentalist standpoint.  
The dominance of the aggregative view with its reduction of democracy to procedures for the 
treatment of interest-groups pluralism is what the new wave of normative political theory 
inaugurated by John Rawls in 1971 with the publication of his book A Theory of Justice3 
began question and that the deliberative model is challenging today. They declare the 
aggregative view  to be at the origin of the current disaffection with democratic institutions 
and of the rampant crisis of legitimacy affecting western democracies. The future of liberal 
democracy, in their view, depends on recovering its moral dimension. While not denying “the 
fact of pluralism” (Rawls) and the necessity to make room for many different conceptions of 
the good, deliberative democrats affirm that it is nevertheless possible to reach a consensus 
that would be deeper than a “mere agreement on procedures”, a consensus that could 
qualify as “moral”. 
Deliberative Democracy: its aims 
In wanting to offer an alternative to the dominant aggregative perspective, with its 
impoverished view of the democratic process, deliberative democrats are, of course, not 
alone. The specificity of their approach resides in promoting a form of normative rationality. 
Distinctive is also their attempt to provide a solid basis of allegiance to liberal democracy by 
reconciling the idea of democratic sovereignty with the defence of liberal institutions. Indeed, 
                                                     
2
 Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy New York: Harper and Brothers 
3
 Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
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it is worth stressing that, while critical of a certain type of “modus-vivendi liberalism”, most of 
the advocates of deliberative democracy are not anti-liberals. Unlike previous Marxist critics, 
they stress the central role of liberal values in the modern conception of democracy. Their 
aim is not to relinquish liberalism but to recover its moral dimension and establish a close 
link between liberal values and democracy. 
Their central claim is that it is possible, thanks to adequate procedures of deliberation, to 
reach forms of agreement that would satisfy both rationality (understood as defence of liberal 
rights) and democratic legitimacy (as represented by popular sovereignty). Their move 
consists in reformulating the democratic principle of popular sovereignty in such a way as to 
eliminate the dangers that it could pose to liberal values. It is the consciousness of those 
dangers that have often made liberals wary of popular participation and keen to find ways to 
discourage or limit it. Deliberative democrats believe that those perils can be avoided, 
thereby allowing liberals to embrace the democratic ideals with much more enthusiasm than 
they have done so far. One proposed solution is to reinterpret popular sovereignty in 
intersubjective terms and to redefine it as “communicatively generated power”.4  
There are many different versions of deliberative democracy but they can roughly be 
classified under two main schools: the first broadly influenced by John Rawls, the second by 
Jürgen Habermas. I will therefore concentrate on these two authors, jointly with two of their 
followers, Joshua Cohen, for the rawlsian side, Seyla Benhabib, for the habermasian one. I 
am of course not denying that there are differences between the two approaches – which I 
will indicate during my discussion – but there are also important convergences, which, from 
the point of view of my inquiry, are more significant than the disagreements.  
As I have already indicated, one of the aims of the deliberative approach – aim shared by 
both Rawls and Habermas – consists in securing a strong link between democracy and 
liberalism, refuting all those critics who – from the right as well as from the left – have 
proclaimed the contradictory nature of liberal democracy. Rawls for instance declares that 
his ambition is to elaborate a democratic liberalism, which would answer to the claim of both 
liberty and equality. He wants to find a solution to the disagreement which has existed in 
democratic thought over the past centuries between the tradition associated with Locke, 
which gives greater weight to what Constant called “the liberties of the moderns”, freedom of 
thought and conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property and the rule of 
law, and the tradition associated with Rousseau, which gives greater weight to what 
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 see for instance Habermas, J. (1996) Three Normative Models of Democracy, in Benhabib, S. (ed) Democracy 
and Difference Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 29 
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Constant called the “liberties of the ancients”, the equal political liberties and the values of 
public life.5  
As far as Habermas is concerned, his recent book Between Facts and Norms makes it clear 
that one of the objectives of his procedural theory of democracy is to bring to the fore the co-
originality of fundamental individual rights and of popular sovereignty. On one side self-
government serves to protect individual rights, on the other side, those rights provide the 
necessary conditions for the exercise of popular sovereignty. Once they are envisaged in 
such a way, he says, “then one can understand how popular sovereignty and human rights 
go hand in hand, and hence grasp the co-originality of civic and private autonomy”.6 
Their followers Cohen and Benhabib also stress the reconciliatory move present in the 
deliberative project. While Cohen states that it is mistaken to envisage the “liberties of the 
modern” as being exterior to the democratic process and that egalitarian and liberal values 
are to be seen as elements of democracy rather than as constraints upon it,7 Benhabib 
declares that the deliberative model can transcend the dichotomy between the liberal 
emphasis on individual rights and liberties and democratic emphasis on collective formation 
and will-formation.8 
Another point of convergence between the two versions of deliberative democracy is their 
common insistence on the possibility of grounding authority and legitimacy on some forms of 
public reasoning and their shared belief in a form of rationality which is not merely 
instrumental but that has a normative dimension, the “reasonable” for Rawls, 
“communicative rationality” for Habermas. In both cases a strong separation is established 
between “mere agreement” and “rational consensus” and the proper field of politics is 
identified with the exchange of arguments among reasonable persons guided by the 
principle of impartiality. 
 Both Habermas and Rawls believe that we can find in the institutions of liberal democracy 
the idealized content of practical rationality. Where they diverge is in their elucidation of the 
form of practical reason embodied in democratic institutions. Rawls emphasises the role of 
principles of justice reached through the device of the “original position” that forces the 
participants to leave aside all their particularities and interests. His conception of “justice as 
fairness” – which states the priority of basic liberal principles – jointly with the “constitutional 
essentials” provides the framework for the exercise of “free public reason”. As far as 
                                                     
5
 Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism New York: Columbia University Press, p. 5 
6
 Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, p.127 
7
 Cohen, J. (1988) “Democracy and Liberty”, in Elster, J. (ed) Deliberative Democracy Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 187 
8
 Benhabib, S. (1996) “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy”. See Benhabib, S. (1996), p. 77 
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Habermas is concerned, he defends what he claims to be a strictly proceduralist approach in 
which no limits are put on the scope and content of the deliberation. It is the procedural 
constraints of the ideal speech situation that will eliminate the positions to which the 
participants in the moral discourse cannot agree . As recalled by Benhabib, the features of 
such a discourse are the following: 1) participation in such deliberation is governed by the 
norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to 
question, to interrogate, and to open debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned 
topics of the conversation; and 3) all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the 
very rule of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied and carried out. 
They are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda of the conversation, or the identity of the 
participants, as long as any excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are 
relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question.9  
From this perspective the basis of legitimacy of democratic institutions is derived from the 
fact that the instances which claim obligatory power do so on the presumption that their 
decisions represent an impartial standpoint which is equally in the interests of all. Cohen, 
after stating that democratic legitimacy arises from collective decisions among equal 
members, declares: ”According to a deliberative conception, a decision is collective just in 
case it emerges from arrangements of binding collective choices that establish conditions of 
free public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions”.10  
In such a view it is not enough for a democratic procedure to take account of the interests of 
all and to reach a compromise that will establish a modus-vivendi. The aim is to generate 
“communicative power” and this requires establishing the conditions for a freely given assent 
of all concerned, hence the importance of finding procedures that would guarantee moral 
impartiality. Only then can one be sure that the consensus that is obtained is a rational one 
and not a mere agreement. This is why the stress  is put on the nature of the deliberative 
procedure and on the types of reasons that are deemed acceptable for competent 
participants. Benhabib puts it in the following way: “According to the deliberative model of 
democracy, it is a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to 
collective decision making processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so 
arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of 
collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals”.11 
For the habermasians, the process of deliberation is guaranteed to have reasonable 
outcomes to the extent that it realizes the condition of the “ideal discourse”: the more equal 
and impartial, the more open the process is, and the less the participants are coerced and 
                                                     
9
 Benhabib, S. ibid., p. 70 
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 Cohen, J. (1998) “Democracy and Liberty”. See Elster, J. (1998), p. 186 
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ready to be guided by the force of the better argument, the more  the higher is the likelihood 
that truly generalizable interests will be accepted by all those relevantly affected. Habermas 
and his followers do not deny that there will be obstacles on the way to the realization of the 
ideal discourse, but those obstacles are conceived as empirical ones. They are due to the 
fact that it is unlikely, given the practical and empirical limitations of social life, that we will 
ever be able to completely leave aside all our particular interests in order to coincide with our 
universal rational self. This is why the ideal speech situation is presented as a “regulative 
idea”. 
 Moreover, Habermas now accepts that there are issues that have to remain outside the 
practices of rational public debate, like existential issues which concern not questions of 
“justice” but the “good life” – this is for him the domain of ethics – or conflicts between 
interests groups about distributive problems that can only be resolved by means of 
compromise. But he considers that this differentiation within the field of issues that require 
political decisions negates neither the prime importance of moral considerations nor the 
practicability of rational debate as the very form of political communication.12 In his view 
fundamental political questions belong to the same category as moral questions and they 
can be decided rationally. Contrary to ethical questions, they do not depend on their context. 
The validity of their answers comes from an independent source and has a universal reach. 
He remains adamant that the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments as envisaged 
by his approach is the most suitable procedure for reaching the rational formation of the will, 
from which the general interest will emerge. 
Deliberative democracy, in both versions considered here, does concede to the aggregative 
model that under modern conditions a plurality of values and interests must be 
acknowledged and that consensus on what Rawls calls “comprehensive” views of a 
religious, moral or philosophical nature has to be relinquished. But its advocates do not 
accept that this entails the impossibility of a rational consensus on political decisions, 
understanding by that not a simple modus vivendi but a moral type of agreement resulting 
from free reasoning among equals. Provided that the procedures of the deliberation secure 
impartiality, equality, openness and lack of coercion, they will guide the deliberation towards 
generalizable interests, which can be agreed upon by all participants thereby producing 
legitimate outcomes. The issue of legitimacy is more heavily stressed by the habermasians 
but there is no fundamental difference between Habermas and Rawls on this question. 
Indeed Rawls defines the liberal principle of legitimacy in a way which is congruent with 
Habermas’s view: “our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it 
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
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 Habermas, J. (1991) “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere” in Calhoun C. (ed) Habermas and the Public 
Sphere Cambridge: The MIT Press, p. 448 
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reasonable and rational”.13 This normative force given to the principle of general justification 
chimes with Habermas’s discourse ethics and this is why one can certainly argue for the 
possibility of reformulating rawlsian political constructivism in the language of discourse 
ethics.14 In fact this is to some respect what Cohen does and this is why he provides a good 
example of the compatibility between the two approaches. He particularly stresses 
deliberative process and affirms that, when envisaged as a system of social and political 
arrangements linking the exercise of power to free reasoning among equals, democracy 
requires the participants not only to be free and equals but also to be “reasonable”. By this 
he means that: “they aim to defend and criticize institutions and programs in terms of 
considerations that others, as free and equals, have reason to accept, given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism”.15 
The flight from pluralism 
After having delineated the main ideas of deliberative democracy, I will now examine more in 
detail some points of the debate between Rawls and Habermas in view of bringing to the 
fore what I see as the crucial shortcoming of the deliberative approach. There are two 
issues, which I take as particularly relevant. 
1. One of the central claims of the “political liberalism” advocated by Rawls is that it is a 
liberalism which is political not metaphysical and which is independent of comprehensive 
views. A clear-cut separation is established between the realm of the private where a 
plurality of different and irreconcilable comprehensive views coexists, and the realm of the 
public where an overlapping consensus can be established over a shared conception of 
justice.  
Habermas contends that Rawls cannot succeed in his strategy of avoiding philosophically 
disputed issues, because it is impossible to develop his theory in the freestanding way that 
he announces. Indeed, his notion of the “reasonable” as well as his conception of the 
“person” necessarily involve him with questions concerning concepts of rationality and truth 
that he pretends to bypass.16 Moreover, Habermas declares that his own approach is 
superior to the rawlsian one because of its strictly procedural character which allow him to 
leave more questions open because if entrusts more to the process of rational opinion and 
will formation.17 By not positing a strong separation between public and private, it is better 
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 Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism New York: Columbia University Press, p. 217 
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 Such an argument is made by Rainer Forst in his review of Political Liberalism in Constellations 1, 1, p. 169 
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 Cohen, J. (1998) “Democracy and Liberty”. See Elster, J. (1998) p. 194 
16
 Habermas, J. (1995) “Reconciliation through the public use of reason. Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism”, The Journal of Philosophy XXCII, 3, p. 126 
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 Habermas, J. ibid., p. 131 
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adapted to accommodate the wide-ranging deliberation that democracy entails. To that, 
Rawls retorts that Habermas’s approach cannot be as strictly procedural as he pretends. It 
must include a substantive dimension given that issues concerning the result of the 
procedures cannot be excluded from their design.18 
I think that they are both right in their respective criticisms. Indeed Rawls’s conception is not 
as independent of comprehensive views as he believes, and Habermas cannot be as purely 
proceduralist as he claims. That both are unable to separate the public from the private or 
the procedural from the substantial as clearly as they declare is very telling. What this 
reveals is the impossibility of achieving what each of them, albeit in different ways, is really 
aiming at, i.e. circumscribing a domain that would not be subject to the pluralism of values 
and where a consensus without exclusion could be established. Indeed, Rawls avoidance of 
comprehensive doctrines is motivated by his belief that no rational agreement is possible in 
this field. This is why in order for liberal institutions to be acceptable to people with differing 
moral, philosophical and religious views, they must be neutral with respect to comprehensive 
views. Hence the strong separation that he tries to install between the realm of the private – 
with its pluralism of irreconcilable values – and the realm of the public, where a political 
agreement on a liberal conception of justice would be secured through the creation of an 
overlapping consensus on justice. 
In the case of Habermas a similar attempt of escaping the implications of value pluralism is 
made through the distinction between ethics-domain which allows for competing conceptions 
of the good life and morality-domain where a strict proceduralism can be implemented and 
impartiality reached leading to the formulation of universal principles. Rawls and Habermas 
want to ground adhesion to liberal democracy on a type of rational agreement that would 
preclude the possibility of contestation. This is why they need to relegate pluralism to a non-
public domain in order to insulate politics from its consequences. That they are unable to 
maintain the tight separation they advocate has very important implications for democratic 
politics. It highlights the fact that the domain of politics – even when fundamental issues like 
justice or basic principles are concerned – is not a neutral terrain that could be insulated 
from the pluralism of values and where rational, universal solutions could be formulated. 
2. Another question concerns the relation between private autonomy and political autonomy. 
As we have seen, both authors aim at reconciling the “liberties of the ancients” with the 
“liberties of the moderns” and they argue that the two types of autonomy necessarily go 
together. However Habermas considers that, only his approach manages to establish the co-
originality of individual rights and democratic participation. He affirms that Rawls 
subordinates democratic sovereignty to liberal rights because he envisages public autonomy 
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as a means to authorize private autonomy. But as Charles Larmore has pointed out,19 
Habermas, for his part, privileges the democratic aspect since he asserts that the importance 
of individual rights lies in their making democratic self-government possible. So we have to 
conclude that, in this case again, neither of them is able to deliver what they announce. What 
they want to avoid here is the recognition that there is a fundamental tension between the 
logic of democracy and the logic of liberalism. They are unable to acknowledge that, while it 
is indeed the case that individual rights and democratic self-government are constitutive of 
liberal democracy – whose novelty resides precisely in the articulation of those two traditions 
– there is a tension between their respective principles that can never be eliminated. To be 
sure, contrary to what adversaries like Carl Schmitt have argued, this does not mean that 
liberal democracy is a doomed regime. Such a tension, though ineradicable, can be 
negotiated in different ways. Indeed, a great part of democratic politics is precisely about the 
negotiation of that tension and the articulation of precarious solutions.20 What is misguided is 
the search for a final rational resolution. Not only it cannot succeed, but moreover it leads to 
putting undue constraints on the political debate. Such a search should be recognized for 
what it really is, another attempt at insulating politics from the effects of the pluralism of 
value, this time by trying to fix once and for all the meaning and hierarchy of the central 
liberal democratic values. Democratic theory should renounce those forms of escapism and 
face the challenge that the recognition of the pluralism of values entails. This does not mean 
accepting a total pluralism and some limits need to be put to the kind of confrontation which 
is going to be seen as legitimate in the public sphere. But the political nature of the limits 
should be acknowledged instead of being presented as requirements of morality or 
rationality. 
Which allegiance for democracy 
If both Rawls and Habermas, albeit in different ways, aim at reaching a form of rational 
consensus instead of a simple modus-vivendi or a mere agreement, it is because they 
believe that, by procuring stable grounds for liberal democracy, such a consensus will 
contribute to securing the future of liberal democratic institutions. As we have seen, while 
Rawls considers that the key issue is justice, for Habermas it has to do with legitimacy. 
According to Rawls a well-ordered society is one, which functions according to the principles 
laid by a shared conception of justice. This is what produces stability and citizen’s 
acceptance of their institutions. For Habermas a stable and well functioning democracy 
requires the creation of a polity integrated through rational insight into legitimacy. This is why 
for the habermasians the central issue lies in finding a way to guarantee that decisions taken 
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by democratic institutions represent an impartial standpoint expressing equally the interests 
of all, which requires establishing procedures able to deliver rational results through 
democratic participation. As put by Seyla Benhabib, “legitimacy in complex democratic 
societies must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all 
on matters of common concern”.21 
In their desire to show the limitations of the democratic consensus as envisaged by the 
aggregative model – only concerned with instrumental rationality and the promotion of self-
interest – deliberative democrats insist on the importance of another type of rationality, the 
rationality at work in communicative action and free public reason. They want to make it the 
central moving force of democratic citizens and the basis of their allegiance to their common 
institutions.  
Their concern with the current state of democratic institutions is one that I share, but I 
consider their answer as being profoundly inadequate. The solution to our current 
predicament does not reside in replacing the dominant “means/ends rationality” by another 
form of rationality, a “deliberative” and “communicative” one. True, there is space for different 
understandings of reason and it is important to complexify the picture offered by the tenants 
of the instrumentalist view. However, simply replacing one type of rationality by another is not 
going to help us addressing the real problem that the issue of allegiance poses. As Michael 
Oakeshott has reminded us the authority of political institutions is not a question of consent 
but of the continuous acknowledgement of cives who recognize their obligation to obey the 
conditions prescribed in res publica.22 Following that  line of thought we can realize that what 
is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble 
of practices that make the constitution of democratic citizens possible. This is not a matter of 
rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By 
privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a 
central element, which is the crucial role, played by passions and emotions  in securing 
allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored and it entails envisaging the 
question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic 
theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a 
conception of the subject, which sees the individuals as prior to society, as bearers of natural 
rights, and either as utility maximizing agents or as rational subjects. In all cases they are 
abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices 
that make the individuality  possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is 
the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. 
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The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the 
rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation 
of democratic citizens. The constitution of democratic individuals can only be made possible 
by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, the forms of life that foster identification with 
democratic values. 
This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different 
understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we 
need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist 
conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active 
involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, 
they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of 
individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other 
side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many 
people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very 
often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The 
growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct 
consequence of the democratic deficit, which characterizes most liberal democratic 
societies. 
To seriously tackle those problems, the only way is to envisage democratic citizenship from a 
different perspective, one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms 
of argumentation. In another context I have argued that the reflections on civil association 
developed by Michael Oakeshot in On Human Conduct are very pertinent for envisaging the 
modern form of political community and the type of bound uniting democratic citizens, the 
specific language of civil intercourse that he calls the respublica.23 Here I would like to 
suggest that we should also take inspiration from Wittgenstein who can provide very 
important insights for a critique of rationalism. In his later work he has shown how, in order to 
have agreements in opinions, there must first be agreement in forms of life. As he says: “So 
you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false. It is what 
human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not 
agreement in opinions but in forms of life”.24 With respect to the question of procedures, 
which is the one that I want to highlight here, this  underlines the necessity for a considerable 
number of “agreements in judgments” to already exist in a society before a given set of 
procedures can work. Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, to agree on the definition of a term 
is not enough and we need agreement in the way we use it. He puts it in the following way: 
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“if language is to be a mean of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also ( queer as this may sound) in judgments”.25 
For him, procedures only exist as a complex ensemble of practices. Those practices 
constitute specific forms of individuality, which make possible the allegiance to the 
procedures. It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life and agreements in 
judgments that procedures can be accepted and followed. They cannot be seen as rules that 
are created on the basis of principles and then applied to specific cases. Rules for 
Wittgenstein are always abridgments of practices; they are inseparable from specific forms 
of life. This indicates that a strict separation between “procedural” and “substantial” or 
between “moral” and “ethical”, separations that are central to the habermasian approach, 
cannot be maintained. Procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments and there 
can never be such thing as purely neutral procedures. 
Following Wittgenstein’s lead  also suggest a very different way of understanding 
communication and the creation of consensus. As he says: ”giving grounds, however, 
justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain proposition striking us 
immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting that is at the 
bottom of the language-game”.26 According to him agreement is established not on 
significations (Meinungen) but on forms of life (Lebensform). It is Einstimmung, fusion of 
voices, made possible by a common form of life, not Einverstand, product of reason – like in 
Habermas. Envisaged from such a standpoint allegiance to democracy and belief in the 
value of its institutions does not depend on giving them an intellectual foundation. It is more 
of the nature of what Wittgenstein links  to a passionate commitment to a system of 
reference. Hence, although it is belief, it is really a way of living, or of assessing one’s life.27 
Contrary to deliberative democracy, such a perspective also implies to acknowledge the 
limits of consensus: ”where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with 
one another, then each man declares the other a fool and an heretic. I said I would combat  
the other man, but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end 
of reasons comes persuasion”.28 
Seeing things in that way should make us realize that taking pluralism seriously requires that 
we give up the dream of a rational consensus, which entails the fantasy that we could 
escape from our human form of life. In our desire for a total grasp, says Wittgenstein”: we 
have got on to the slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the 
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conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk: so we need 
friction. Back to the rough ground”.29 
“Back to the rough ground” means here coming to terms with the fact that, far from being 
merely empirical or epistemological, the obstacles to rationalist devices like the “original 
condition” or “the ideal discourse” are ontological. Indeed, the free and unconstrained public 
deliberation of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility since the 
particular forms of life, which are presented as its “impediments” are its very condition of 
possibility. Without them no communication, no deliberation would ever take place. There is 
absolutely no justification for attributing a special privilege to a so-called “moral point of view” 
governed by rationality and impartiality and where a rational universal consensus could be 
reached. 
An “Agonistic” Model of Democracy  
Besides putting the emphasis on practices and language games, an alternative to the 
rationalist framework also requires coming to terms with the fact that power is constitutive of 
social relations. One of the shortcomings of the deliberative approach is that, by postulating 
the availability of a public sphere where power would have been eliminated and where a 
rational consensus could be realized, this model of democratic politics is unable to 
acknowledge the dimension of antagonism that the pluralism of values entails and its 
ineradicable character. This is why it is bound to miss the specificity of the political, which it 
can only envisage as a specific domain of morality. Deliberative democracy provides a very 
good illustration of what Carl Schmitt had said about liberal thought: “In a very systematic 
fashion liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics and moves instead in a typical 
always recurring polarity of two heterogeneous sphere, namely ethics and economics”.30 
Indeed, to the aggregative model, inspired by economics, the only alternative deliberative 
democrats can put forward  is one that collapses politics into ethics. 
In order to remedy this serious deficiency, we need a democratic model able to grasp the 
nature of the political. This requires developing an approach, which places the question of 
power and antagonism at its very center. It is such an approach that I want to advocate and 
whose theoretical bases have been delineated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.31 The 
central thesis of the book is that social objectivity is constituted through acts of power. This 
implies that any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to show the traces of 
                                                     
29
 Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 46e 
30
 Schmitt, C. (1976) The Concept of the Political New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p. 70 
31
 Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
London: Verso 
14 — Chantal Mouffe / Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism — I H S 
 
exclusion, which governs its constitution. This point of convergence – or rather mutual 
collapse – between objectivity and power is what we meant by “hegemony”. This way of 
posing the problem indicates that power should not be conceived as an external relation 
taking place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather as constituting the identities 
themselves. Since any political order is the expression of a hegemony, of a specific pattern 
of power relations, political practice cannot be envisaged in simply representing the interests 
of pre-constituted identities, but in constituting those identities themselves in a precarious 
and always vulnerable terrain. 
To assert the hegemonic nature of any kind of social order is to operate a displacement of 
the traditional relation between democracy and power. According to the deliberative 
approach, the more democratic a society is, the less power would be constitutive of social 
relations. But if we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main 
question for democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute  forms of 
power more compatible with democratic values. 
Coming to terms with the constitutive nature of power implies relinquishing the ideal of a 
democratic society as the realization of a perfect harmony or transparency. The democratic 
character of a society can only be based on the fact that no limited social actor can attribute 
to herself the representation of the totality and claim to have the “mastery” of the foundation. 
Democracy requires, therefore, that the purely constructed nature of social relations finds its 
complement in the purely pragmatic grounds of the claims to power legitimacy. This implies 
that there is no unbridgeable gap between power and legitimacy – not obviously in the sense 
that all power is automatically legitimate, but in the sense that: a) if any power has been able 
to impose itself, it is because it has been recognized as legitimate in some quarters; and b) if 
legitimacy is not based on a aprioristic ground, it is because it is based on some form of 
successful power. This link between legitimacy and power and the hegemonic order that this 
entails is precisely what the deliberative approach forecloses by positing the possibility of a 
type of rational argumentation where power has been eliminated and where legitimacy is 
grounded on pure rationality.  
Once the theoretical terrain has been delineated in such a way, we can begin formulating an 
alternative to both the aggregative and the deliberative model, one that I propose to call 
“agonistic pluralism”.32 A first distinction is needed in order to clarify the new perspective that 
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I am putting forward, the distinction between “politics” and “the political”. By “the political”, I 
refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can 
take many forms and emerge in different type of social relations. “Politics”, on the other 
hand, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to 
establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always 
potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of “the political”. I consider 
that it is only when we acknowledge the dimension of “the political” and understand that 
“politics” consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism 
that exists in human relations, that we can pose what I take to be the central question for 
democratic politics. This question, pace the rationalists, is not how to arrive at a consensus 
without exclusion, since this would imply the eradication of the political. Politics aims at the 
creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation 
of an “us” by the determination of a “them”. The novelty of democratic politics is not the 
overcoming of this us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the different way in 
which it is established. The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way 
that is compatible with pluralist democracy. 
Envisaged from the point of view of “agonistic pluralism”, the aim of democratic politics is to 
construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be 
destroyed, but an “adversary”, i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to 
defend those ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal democratic 
tolerance, which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to 
standpoints that we disagree with, but treating those who defend them as legitimate 
opponents. This category of the “adversary” does not eliminate antagonism, though, and it 
should be distinguished from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes 
identified. An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some 
common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of 
liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree  on the meaning and implementation 
of those principles and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through 
deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of value, there 
is not rational resolution of the conflict, hence its antagonistic dimension.33 This does not 
mean of course that adversaries can never cease to disagree but that does not prove that 
antagonism has been eradicated. To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical 
change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion than a process of rational 
persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific 
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paradigm is a conversion). Compromises are, of course, also possible; they are part and 
parcel of politics; but they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation. 
Introducing the category of the “adversary” requires complexifying the notion of antagonism 
and distinguishing it from agonism. Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism 
is struggle between adversaries. We can therefore reformulate our problem by saying that 
envisaged from the perspective of “agonistic pluralism” the aim of democratic politics is to 
transform antagonism into agonism. This requires providing channels through which 
collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues, which, while 
allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but 
as an adversary. An important difference with the model of “deliberative democracy”, is that 
for “agonistic pluralism”, the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions 
from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to 
mobilize those passions towards democratic designs. 
One of the key thesis of agonistic pluralism is that, far from jeopardizing democracy, 
agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence. Modern democracy’s 
specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by 
imposing an authoritarian order. Breaking with the symbolic representation of society as an 
organic body – which was characteristic of the holist mode of social organization – a 
democratic society acknowledges the pluralism of values, the “disenchantment of the world” 
diagnosed by Max Weber and the unavoidable conflicts that it entails.  
I agree with those who affirm that a pluralist democracy demands a certain amount of 
consensus and that it requires allegiance to the values, which constitute its “ethico-political 
principles”. But since those ethico-political principles can only exist through many different 
and conflicting interpretations, such a consensus is bound to be a “conflictual consensus”. 
This is indeed the privileged terrain of agonistic confrontation among adversaries. Ideally 
such a confrontation should be staged around the diverse conceptions of citizenship, which 
correspond to the different interpretations of the ethico-political principles: liberal-
conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, etc. Each of them proposes 
its own interpretation of the “common good”, and tries to implement a different form of 
hegemony. To foster allegiance to its institutions, a democratic system requires the 
availability of those contending forms of citizenship identification. They provide the terrain in 
which passions can be mobilized around democratic objectives and antagonism transformed 
into agonism. 
A well functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this 
is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a 
confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as it is the case with identity 
politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy 
and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of 
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collective passions around issues, which cannot be managed by the democratic process and 
an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility. 
It is for that reason that the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot be to reach a rational 
consensus in the public sphere. Such a consensus cannot exist. We have to accept that 
every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of 
power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion. The idea that power could be 
dissolved through a rational debate and that legitimacy could be based on pure rationality 
are illusions, which can endanger democratic institutions.  
What the deliberative democracy model is denying is the dimension of undecidability and the 
ineradicability of antagonism, which are constitutive of the political. By postulating the 
availability of a non exclusive public sphere of deliberation where a rational consensus could 
be obtained, they negate the inherently conflictual nature of modern pluralism. They are 
unable to recognize that bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a decision 
which excludes other possibilities and for which one should never refuse to bear 
responsibility by invoking the commands of general rules or principles. This is why a 
perspective like “agonistic pluralism” which reveals the impossibility of establishing a 
consensus without exclusion is of fundamental importance for democratic politics. By 
warning us again of the illusion that a fully achieved democracy could ever be instantiated, it 
forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive. To make room for dissent and to foster 
the institutions in which it can be manifested is vital for a pluralist democracy and one should 
abandon the very idea that there could ever be a time in which it would cease to be 
necessary because the society is now “well ordered”. An “agonistic” approach acknowledges 
the real nature of its frontiers and the forms of exclusion that they entail, instead of trying to 
disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality.  
Asserting the hegemonic nature of social relations and identities, can contribute to 
subverting the ever-present temptation existing in democratic societies to naturalize its 
frontiers and essentialize its identities. For this reason it is much more receptive than the 
deliberative model to the multiplicity of voices that contemporary pluralist societies 
encompass and to the complexity of their power structure.  
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